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Abstract
This paper deals with the estimation of the behavioral and welfare eﬀects of coun-
terfactual policy interventions in dynamic structural models where all the primitive
functions are nonparametrically speciﬁed (i.e., preferences, technology, transition rules,
and distribution of unobserved variables). It proves the nonparametric identiﬁcation
of agents’ decision rules, before and after the policy intervention, and of the change
in agents’ welfare. Based on these results we propose a nonparametric procedure to
estimate the behavioral and welfare eﬀects of a general class of counterfactual policy
interventions. The nonparametric estimator can be used to construct a test of the
validity of a particular parametric speciﬁcation. We apply this method to evaluate hy-
pothetical reforms in the rules of a public pension system using a model of retirement
behavior and a sample of workers in Sweden.
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Discrete choice dynamic structural models have proven useful tools for the assessment of
public policy initiatives (Wolpin, 1996). These econometric models have been applied to the
evaluation of economic policies, hypothetical or factual, such as welfare programs (Sanders
and Miller, 1997, Keane and Moﬃt, 1998, and Keane and Wolpin, 2000), unemployment
insurance (Ferrall, 1997), social security pensions (Berkovec and Stern, 1991, and Rust and
Phelan, 1997), patents regulation (Pakes, 1986), educational policies (Eckstein and Wolpin,
1999, and Keane and Wolpin, 1997 and 2001), contraceptive choice (Hotz and Miller, 1993),
regulation on labor contracts (Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego, 1999, and Rota, 2004),
programs on child poverty (Todd and Wolpin, 2003), scrapping subsidies (Adda and Cooper,
2000), or regulation of nuclear plants (Sturm, 1991, and Rust and Rothwell, 1995), among
others.
A common feature of the econometric models in these applications is the parametric spec-
iﬁcation of the structural functions in the model, i.e., utility function, technology, transition
probabilities of state variables, and the probability distribution of unobservable variables.1
These parametric models contrast with the emphasis on robustness and nonparametric spec-
iﬁcation that we ﬁnd in other econometric approaches to the evaluation of public policies. In
particular, the literature on evaluation of treatment eﬀects has emphasized the importance
of a nonparametric speciﬁcation of the distribution of unobservables to obtain robust results
(see Heckman and Robb, 1985, Manski, 1990, and more recently Heckman and Smith, 1998,
and Heckman and Vytlacil, 1999 and 2005). Though robustness is an important argument in
favor of this evaluation approach, at its current stage it has limitations to evaluate counter-
factual policies, to estimate welfare eﬀects, to incorporate transitional dynamics, or to allow
for general equilibrium eﬀects. It is in this context where dynamic structural models can
be particularly useful. These structural models incorporate assumptions on individual be-
1Two exceptions are the semiparametric models in Taber (2000) and Heckman and Navarro (2004), where
utilities are parametrically speciﬁed but the distribution of unobservable variables is nonparametric.
1havior and on the equilibrium concept, e.g., rational expectations, competitive equilibrium.
In addition to these economic assumptions, does the identiﬁcation of these models require a
parametric speciﬁcation of the primitives? This question is the main theme of this paper.2
In this paper we show that it is possible to use nonparametrically speciﬁed dynamic
structural models to evaluate the eﬀects of counterfactual policy interventions. The paper
has three main contributions. First, for a broad class of models, data and policies, we show
that agents’ behavior before and after the policy intervention, and the change in agents’ wel-
fare are nonparametrically identiﬁed. Second, based on this identiﬁcation result we propose
a nonparametric method to estimate the behavioral and welfare eﬀects of counterfactual
policy interventions. When the eﬀect of interest is conditional on agents’ state variables, the
estimator is subject to the standard "curse of dimensionality" in nonparametric estimation
(i.e., the speed of convergence of the estimator to its true value decreases with the number
of explanatory variables). However, the estimates of unconditional eﬀects are root-n con-
sistent. Therefore, it is possible to obtain precise estimates of policy eﬀe c t se v e nw h e nt h e
speciﬁcation of the structural model contains a relatively large number of state variables. As
a third contribution, we apply this method to evaluate hypothetical reforms in the rules of
a public pension system using data of male blue-collar workers in Sweden. This application
illustrates how the method can be used to obtain precise estimates of behavioral and welfare
eﬀects which do not rely on any parametric assumption on the primitives of the model.
As shown by Rust (1994) and Magnac and Thesmar (2002), the diﬀerences between the
utilities of two choice alternatives cannot be identiﬁed in dynamic decision models even when
the researcher "knows" the time discount factor, the probability distribution of the unob-
servables, and the transition probabilities of the state variables. This under-identiﬁcation
2The economic content of a dynamic structural model does not rest on the choice of a particular family
of parametric functions for the primitives but on general assumptions which are essentially nonparamet-
ric such as: the selection of the relevant decision and state variables; independence assumptions between
unobservable variables and some observables; the stochastic structure of the transition probabilities of the
state variables (e.g., which variables follow exogenous transitions, and which variables are endogenous and
why); monotonicity and concavity assumptions of some primitive functions; speciﬁcation of individual het-
erogeneity; or the equilibrium concept that is used. Of course, these assumptions remain (and become more
transparent!) once we remove parametric assumptions from our structural models.
2result contrasts with the identiﬁcation of utility diﬀerences in static (i.e., not forward look-
ing) decision models (see Matzkin, 1992). This paper takes a diﬀe r e n tl o o ka tt h ep r o b l e m
of nonparametric identiﬁcation of dynamic decision models. Instead of looking at the non-
parametric identiﬁcation of the utility function we consider the identiﬁcation of the behav-
ioral and welfare eﬀects of counterfactual policy changes. More speciﬁcally, we prove the
identiﬁcation of agents’ choice probability functions and surplus functions associated with
hypothetical policy interventions. We show that knowledge of the current utility function or
of utility diﬀerences is not necessary to identify these counterfactual functions. These coun-
terfactuals depend on the distribution of unobservables and on the diﬀerence between the
present value of choosing always the same alternative and the value of deviating one period
from that behavior. We show that these objects are identiﬁed under similar conditions as in
static models.
The class of dynamic discrete structural models that has been most commonly used in
empirical applications is the one in Rust (1994) that assumes that unobserved state variables
are not correlated over time. This paper also considers Rust’s framework. Understanding
identiﬁcation in this framework is a necessary ﬁrst step before considering models with more
general structure for the unobservables.3 As we have explained in footnote 2, this class of
models incorporate explicitly important economic assumptions such as rational expectations
and behavior, an equilibrium concept, etc. An open question is which of these assumptions
are really necessary for identiﬁcation and which ones might be relaxed. This paper does
not study this type of identiﬁcation issue, but we think that the results in this paper are a
necessary ﬁrst step before studying the empirical content of deeper economic assumptions.
During the last years, there has been an increasing interest in the nonparametric identiﬁ-
cation, and in the validation, of dynamic structural models. Recent important contributions
in this area Magnac and Thesmar (2002), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003), Heckman
and Navarro (2005), Aguirregabiria (2005), and Bajari and Hong (2006).
3Though the identiﬁcation results in this paper might be extended to models with unobserved hetero-
geneity ala Heckman-Singer, we have not explored this possibility in this paper.
3The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set up the model, the basic
assumptions and the type of counterfactual policy experiments that we want to evaluate.
Section 3 presents the identiﬁcation results. In section 4 we describe the estimation proce-
dure. The empirical application is presented in section 5. We summarize and conclude in
section 6.
2M o d e l
2.1 Framework and basic assumptions
Time is discrete an indexed by t. Consider an agent who has preferences deﬁned over a
sequence of states of the world between periods 0 and T,w h e r et h et i m eh o r i z o nT can be
ﬁnite or an inﬁnite. A state of the world has two components: a vector of state variables st
that is predetermined before period t, and a discrete decision at ∈ A = {0,1,...,J} that the
agent chooses at period t. The decision at period t aﬀects the evolution of future values of
the state variables. The agent’s preferences over possible sequences of states of the world can
be represented by the time-separable utility function
PT
j=0 β
j Ut(at+j,s t+j),w h e r eβ ∈ [0,1)
is the discount factor and Ut(at,s t) is the current utility function at period t. The agent
has uncertainty about future values of state variables. His beliefs about future states can be
represented by a sequence of Markov transition probability functions Ft(st+1|at,s t).T h e s e
beliefs are rational in the sense that they are the true transition probabilities of the state
variables. Every period t the agent observes the vector of state variables st and chooses his




j Ut(at+j,s t+j) | at,s t
´
. (1)
Let αt(st) and Vt(st)be the optimal decision rule and the value function at period t, respec-
tively. By Bellman principle of optimality the sequence of value functions can be obtained









4And the optimal decision rule αt(st) is equal to argmaxa∈A{Ut(a,st)+β
R
Vt+1(st+1)dFt(st+1|a,st)}.
Suppose that we observe a random sample of agents who behave according to this model.
We index agents in the sample by i ∈ {1,2,...,n}.A si ti st y p i c a l l yt h ec a s ei nm i c r op a n e l s ,
we observe each individual over a short period of time: e.g., two, three periods. Without loss
of generality for our identiﬁcation results, we will consider that each individual is observed
for two periods. It is important to note that in this paper the time index t does not represent
calendar-time but the agent-speciﬁc period in the agent’s decision problem. To emphasize
this agent-speciﬁct i m e ,w er e f e rt ot as the agent’s age. In some parts of the paper we will
also emphasize this point by using the variable ti to represent the agent i0s age. For each
agent in the sample, the econometrician observes his action, ait,a n das u b v e c t o rxit of the
vector of state variables sit, i.e., xit ⊂ sit. In many applications of dynamic decision models,
the researcher also observes an outcome variable yit that is a component of the current
payoﬀ function. For instance, in a model of ﬁrm behavior the researcher may observe a
component of the proﬁt function such as output, revenue or the wage bill. In a model of
individual behavior the econometrician may observe individual earnings, that is a component
of current utility. In summary, the data set can be described as:
Data = {ait,x it,y it : i =1 ,2,...,n; t = ti,t i +1 } (3)
Note that the outcome variable yit is neither a decision nor a state variable, but it is
an outcome that depends on the agent’s decision and state variables. We represent this
relationship using the structural outcome equation:
yit = ht (ait,x it,ωit) (4)
where ωit ⊂ sit is an unobserved state variable. For example, if yit is ﬁrm’s output, then ht(.)
is a production function and ωit is an unobserved productivity shock. Or in an application
where yit represents individual’s earnings, we have that ht(.) is an earnings function and ωit
is a shock in earnings. Therefore, xit and ωit are components of the vector of state variables
sit. We represent the rest of the state variables using the vector εit,t h a tc o n t a i n sa l lt h e
5unobserved state variables, for the researcher, which do not enter in the outcome function
ht.T h u s ,sit =( xit,ωit,ε it).
Let a ∈ A be an arbitrary choice alternative, not necessarily the optimal alternative.
Without loss of generality we can write the one-period utility associated with a as the sum
of two components:
Ut(a,sit)=ut(a,xit,ωit)+εt(a,xit,ωit),
where: ut(a,xit,ωit) ≡ Median(Ut(a,sit) | xit,ω it),
and: εt(a,xit,ωit) ≡ Ut(a,sit) − ut(a,xit,ωit)
(5)
For the sake of notational simplicity we use εit(a) instead of εt(a,xit,ωit), and the vector
εit to represent {εit(0), εit(1), ..., εit(J)}. By construction, the random variables in εit have
median equal to zero and are median independent of xit and ωit.4
We consider the following assumptions on the joint distribution of the state variables.
ASSUMPTION 1: The cumulative transition probability of the state variables factors as:
F(si,t+1|ait,s it)=Fω(ωi,t+1|ωit) Fε|x(εi,t+1|xi,t+1) Fx(xi,t+1|ait,x it) (6)
where Fω(.|ω), Fε(.|x) and Fx(.|a,x) are distribution functions. That is: (A) ωit follows an
exogenous Markov process; (B) εit may depend on contemporaneous xit (e.g., heterocedas-
ticity) but not on previous values of a, x or ε; (C) conditional on xt and at, the vector
xt+1 does not depend on ωt and εt;a n d( D )Fε|x is continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly
increasing with support the Euclidean space.
Assumption 1 is based on Rust’s conditional independence assumption (Rust, 1994),
b u ti ti sm o r eg e n e r a lt h a nR u s t ’ sb e c a u s ei ta l l o w sf o rt h eu n o b s e r v a b l eωit.U n d e r t h i s
assumption the optimal decision rule αt(sit) can be described as:
αt(sit)=a r gm a x
a∈A
{ vt(a,xit,ω it)+εit(a) } (7)
4A more common condition in the discrete choice literature is that εi has zero mean and is mean inde-
pendent of the observable state variables. Instead, we consider median independence because it simpliﬁes
the nonparametric estimation of the distribution of ε.
6where the functions vt(0,x,ω), vt(1,x,ω), ..., vt(J,x,ω) are alternative-speciﬁc value func-















The optimal decision rule represents individuals’ behavior. Individuals’ welfare is given by
the value function Vt(st)=m a x a∈A {vt(a,xt,ω t)+εt(a)}. For the econometric analysis it is
convenient to deﬁne versions of these functions which are integrated over the unobservables
in ε.T h echoice probability function is deﬁned as:
Pt(a|xt,ωt) ≡
Z
I{α(xt,ωt,ε t)=a} Fε|x(dεt) (9)







{ vt(a,xt,ωt)+εt(a) } Fε|x(dεt) (10)
To complete the description of the model we have to establish how the outcome variable yit
enters into the utility function. Assumption 2 establishes that the utility function ut (a,x,ω)
is linear in the outcome variable.
ASSUMPTION 2: The utility function ut(a,xt,ωt) has the following form:
ut(a,xt,ω t)=ψt(xt) yt + ct(a,xt) (11)
where the function ψt(.) is positive valued, and ct(.,.) is a real valued function.
The structural functions of the model are {ψt,h t,c t,β , Fω,F ε,F x}.T h i si st h es oc a l l e d
model structure.
2.2 Policy interventions
We want to evaluate the behavioral and welfare eﬀects of an hypothetical policy intervention
that modiﬁes the current utility function. Let Ut be the utility function in the data generating
process,a n dl e tU∗
t be the utility function under the counterfactual policy. Assumption 3
describes the class of policy interventions that we consider in this paper.
7ASSUMPTION 3: The counterfactual policy is such that: (A) It can be represented as a
change in the payoﬀ or utility function, from function Ut to function U∗
t .( B )T h o u g ht h e
econometrician does not know neither function Ut nor U∗
t ,h ek n o w st h ed i ﬀerence between




t (a,s) − Ut(a,s)
ψt(x)
(12)
And (C) the function τt(a,s) does not depend on ε, i.e., τt(a,s)=τt(a,x,ω).
The function τt represents the policy intervention and it is known to the researcher,
though the functions Ut and U∗
t are unknown. Assumption 3 establishes that the policy
intervention should be such that it can be measured in units of one of the outcome variable
y. This assumption includes a broad class of counterfactual experiments. For instance, any
change in the vector of outcome functions ht(a,x,ω) is a particular case of this class of
experiments. Note that the function τt may depend on (a,x,ω) in a completely unrestricted
w a y ,b u ti tc a n n o td e p e n do nt h eu n o b s e r v a b l eε. We provide several examples to illustrate
how general is this class of policy interventions.
EXAMPLE 1: Consider a model of retirement from the labor force as in Rust and Phelan
(1997). The outcome variable in this model is individual earnings. The type of policies that
we can evaluate includes: policies that modify retirement beneﬁts such as changes in the
minimum and normal retirement age, or changes in the discount (premium) for early (late)
retirement; policies that aﬀect labor earnings such as a wage tax; or an hypothetical change
in the risk aversion parameter.
EXAMPLE 2: Consider a model of occupational choice as in Keane and Wolpin (1997)
where individual earnings are observable. Some examples of policies that we can evaluate in
this model are a change in returns to schooling in a certain occupation, or a change in the
costs of schooling.
EXAMPLE 3: Consider a dynamic model of ﬁrm investment in physical capital where the
8researcher observes ﬁrm output. In this model we can evaluate hypothetical changes in the
production function parameters; or a sales tax.
Let {Pt} and {Vσ,t} be the choice probability functions and the integrated value functions
before the policy intervention. And let {P∗
t } and {V ∗
σ,t} be these functions after the policy
intervention. We represent the behavioral eﬀects of the policy by comparing the functions
P∗
t and Pt. Similarly, the diﬀerence between the functions V ∗
σ,t and Vσ,t represents the welfare
eﬀects of the policy. We are interested in the nonparametric estimation of the functions Pt,
P∗
t and V ∗
σ,t − Vσ,t. Given probability functions {Pt} and {P∗
t }, we can simulate the future
evolution of the variables {xt,yt,a t} starting from the initial period in which the hypothetical
policy is implemented. That is, we can obtain the transition dynamics associated with the
policy change and so derive the cross-sectional distribution of the state variables one period,
two periods, etc, after the policy change.
2.3 An example: A model of capital replacement
Dynamic structural models of machine replacement have been considered before by, among
others, Rust (1987), Das (1992), Kennet (1993), Rust and Rothwell (1995), Cooper, Halti-
wanger and Power (1999), Adda and Cooper (2000) and Kasahara (2004). Most of these
studies use the estimated structural model to evaluate the behavioral eﬀects of a policy
change. Kennet (1993) studies how deregulation of the US airline industry aﬀected the num-
ber of aircraft engine hours between major overhauls. Rust and Rothwell (1995) analyze the
impact on the operation of US nuclear power plants of an increase in the intensity of safety
regulation by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission after an accident on March 1979.
Adda and Cooper (2000) evaluate the eﬀects of a policy in France in which the government
subsidized the replacement of old cars with new ones. Kasahara (2004) examines the impact
on ﬁrms’ investment in equipment of a temporary increase in import tariﬀs in Chile.
Consider a ﬁrm that produces a good using capital and some perfectly ﬂexible inputs.
The ﬁrm has multiple plants and each plant consists of only one machine. Production at
9diﬀerent plants is independent and therefore we can concentrate in the decision problem for
an individual plant or machine. Let xt represent time since last machine replacement, that
is the age of the existing machine at the beginning of month t.A n dl e tat ∈ {0,1} be the
indicator of the decision of replacing the old machine by a new machine at the beginning of
month t. Therefore, the age of the machine that is used during month t is (1 − at)xt,a n d
the transition of the variable x is:
xt+1 =( 1− at)( xt +1 )+at (13)
The output that a machine produces during month t depends on the age of the machine,
a n do nap r o d u c t i v i t ys h o c kωt that follows a Markov process.5 The proﬁtf u n c t i o nh a st h e
following form:
Ut = Y ((1 − at)xt,ωt) − MC((1 − at)xt,ε
MC
t ) − at RC(xt,ε
RC
t ) (14)
where Y (.,.) is the production function; MC(.,.) is the maintenance cost, that depends on
the age of the machine and on a random shock εMC
t that is unobservable to the researcher;
and RC(.,.) is the replacement cost net of the scrapping value of the retired capital. The
replacement cost is realized only if the machine is replaced and it depends on the age of the
replaced machine (not the used one) and on a random shock εRC
t that is also unobservable
to the researcher.
T os h o wt h a tt h i sm o d e lh a st h ef o r mt h a tw eh a v ep o s t u l a t e di nA s s u m p t i o n s1a n d
2, consider the following deﬁnitions: (1) the function c(0,x t) is the median of MC(xt,ε MC
t )
conditional on xt; (2) the function c(1,x t) is the median of MC(0,ε MC
t )+RC(xt,ε RC
t ) condi-
tional on xt;( 3 )t h ev a r i a b l eεt(0) is the diﬀerence between MC(xt,ε MC
t ) and its conditional
median c(0,x t); and (4) the variable εt(1) is the diﬀerence between MC(0,ε MC
t )+RC(xt,ε RC
t )
and its conditional median c(1,x t). Given these deﬁnitions, we have that:
Ut = Y ((1 − at)xt,ωt) − c(at,x t) − εt(at) (15)
5The amount of variable inputs is a function the age of the machine and the productivity shock and
therefore we can omit it from our analysis. Note that the "productivity shock" may include shocks in the
prices of variable inputs.
10where εt(0) and εt(1) are zero conditional median random variables.
Suppose that we are interested in evaluating the eﬀects of a counterfactual policy that
modiﬁes ﬁrms’ replacement costs. This policy tries to promote the retirement of old capital
by providing a subsidy that depends on the age of the retired capital. The amount of the






0 if xt <x ∗
low
at (τ0 − τ1 [xt − x∗
low]) if x∗
high ≤ xt ≤ x∗
low
0 if xt >x ∗
high
(16)
where τ0 > 0, τ1 > 0, x∗
low and x∗
high are parameters that characterize the policy. The subsidy
is zero if replacement takes place either too early (i.e., before age x∗
low) or too late (i.e., after
age x∗
high). For replacement ages within the range [x∗
low,x ∗
high] the subsidy is strictly positive
and it decreases linearly with the age of capital. This type of policy has been common
in many countries and it has been motivated as part of an environmental policy to reduce
emissions of carbon dioxide.
3I d e n t i ﬁcation
Suppose that we have a random sample of individuals with information on the variables
{aiti,a i,ti+1,x iti,x i,ti+1,y iti,y i,ti+1}. As usual, we study identiﬁcation with a very large (i.e.,
inﬁnite) sample of individuals.6 For the sake of simplicity, we concentrate in binary choice
models. However, the identiﬁcation results and the estimation method can be generalized
to the multinomial case. Consider the binary choice case where a ∈ {0,1}. For notational
simplicity we use Pt(x,ω) to denote Pt(1|x,ω). Also, we assume that the outcome function
h is identiﬁed without having to estimate the rest of the structural model. There are dif-
ferent conditions under which one can consistently estimate wage equations or production
functions using instrumental variables or control function approaches which do not require
the estimation of the complete structural model (see Olley and Pakes, 1996, and Imbens and
6Furthermore, we assume that the sample has variability over the whole support of the observable vari-
ables: A × [1,T]2 × X2 × Y 2. This assumption of full-support variation is needed to identify the reduced
form of the model.
11N e w e y ,2 0 0 2 ) .W ep r o v i d ea ne x a m p l e sf o rt h ei d e n t i ﬁcation of h in the empirical application
of retirement behavior in section 4.
ASSUMPTION 4: The outcome functions ht(0,x,ω) and ht(1,x,ω) are real valued func-
tions such that: (A) they are identiﬁed from the data {aiti,a i,ti+1,x iti,x i,ti+1,y iti,y i,ti+1};
(B) they are strictly monotonic in ω, such that we can invert these functions to obtain
ωit = h−1(ait,x it,y it);( C )ωit is a continuous random variable with support Ω; and (D) the
transition probability Fω(ωt+1|ωt) is such that if q(ω) is a strictly increasing function, then
E(q(ωt+1)|ωt)=
R
q(ωt+1)Fω(dωt+1|ωt) is also a strictly increasing function of ωt.
Assumption 4 implies that the transition probability functions Fx and Fω are nonpara-
metrically identiﬁed. We can identify Fx on A × X2 from the transition probabilities
Pr(xi,ti+1|aiti,x iti) in the data. Furthermore, under Assumption 4 the values of ωiti and
ωiti+1 can be consistently estimated and we can treat these variables as observables. There-
fore, Fω is also identiﬁed on Ω × Ω from the probabilities Pr(ωiti+1|ωiti) in the data. It is
a l s oc l e a rt h a tw ec a ni d e n t i f yt h ec h o i c ep r o b a b i l i t yf u n c t i o n sPt(x,ω) on X × Ω from the
probabilities Pr(aiti =1 |xiti,ω iti,t i = t) in the data. However, without further restrictions,
we cannot identify the structural functions {ψt,c t,F ε|x,t}. This is the case both in decision
models where agents are forward looking (i.e., β>0) and in models where agents are myopic
(i.e., β =0 ). In this paper we are not interested in the identiﬁcation of {ψt,c t,F ε|x,t} but
in the functions P∗
t and V ∗
σ,t − Vσ,t associated with a counterfactual policy intervention. We
show below that the following Assumption 5, together with Assumptions 1 to 4, is suﬃcient
to identify the functions P∗
t and V ∗
σ,t − Vσ,t.
ASSUMPTION 5: Deﬁne the functions ˜ ht(x,ω) ≡ ht(1,x,ω) − ht(0,x,ω). This function
˜ ht(x,ω) is: (A) strictly increasing in ω; and (B) for any x ∈ X, it is unbounded from above,
such that for any constant k ≥ ˜ ht(x,−∞) there exits a value ω ∈ Ω such that ˜ ht(x,ω)=k.
For the sake of presentation, we start showing identiﬁcation in a myopic version of the
model.
123.1 Myopic model
Suppose that agents are not forward looking, i.e., β =0 . Then, the counterfactual choice
probability function is:
P∗
t (x,ω)=P r ( U∗
t (1,s) ≥ U∗



















Deﬁne the functions ˜ ct(x) ≡ (ct(1,x)−c0(1,x))/ψt(x) and ˜ τt(x,ω) ≡ τt(1,x,ω)−τt(0,x,ω),
and the random variable ˜ εt ≡ (εt(0) − εt(1))/ψt(x).L e t F˜ ε|x,t be the CDF of the random
variable ˜ εt conditional to x. Then, using these deﬁnitions, the previous expression of P∗
t (x,ω)
c a nb ew r i t t e na s :
P∗
t (x,ω) F˜ ε|x,t
³
˜ τt(x,ω)+˜ ht(x,ω)+˜ ct(x)
´
(18)
By the conditions in Assumptions 3 and 4, the functions ˜ τt and ˜ ht are known to the re-
searcher. Equation (18) shows that the identiﬁcation of P∗
t requires one to identify the
functions F˜ ε|x,t and ˜ ct. The relationship between these functions and the factual reduced






Proposition 1 establishes the nonparametric identiﬁcation of the counterfactual probability
function P∗
t .
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that Assumptions 1 to 5 hold and β =0 . For any period t, deﬁne
the set [X × Ω]∗
t ≡ {(x,ω) ∈ X × Ω :˜ τt(x,ω)+˜ ht(x,ω) ≥ ˜ ht(x,−∞)}. The counterfactual
choice probability function P∗
t is identiﬁed over the set [X×Ω]∗
t.F o ra n y(x0,ω0) ∈ [X×Ω]∗
t







t (x0,ω 0) is a function from [X × Ω]∗
t into Ω that is implicitly deﬁned as the value
ω ∈ Ω that solves the equation ˜ ht(x0,ω)=˜ τt(x0,ω 0)+˜ ht(x0,ω 0). Furthermore, the function
13˜ ct is identiﬁed on X and F˜ ε|x,t is identiﬁed on the set ˜ ut(X ×Ω)×X,w h e r e˜ ut(X ×Ω) ⊆ R
is the space of real values that the function ˜ ht(x,ω)+˜ ct(x) can take.
Proof. By Assumption 5, the function ω
(τ)
t (x0,ω 0) e x i s t sa n di su n i q u ea ta n yp o i n t(x0,ω0) ∈
[X × Ω]∗















Given that the factual choice probability function Pt is identiﬁed on X ×Ω and the function
ω
(τ)
t is identiﬁed on [X × Ω]∗
t, it is clear that P∗
t is identiﬁed [X × Ω]∗
t. We now prove
the identiﬁcation of functions ˜ ct and F˜ ε|x,t.D e ﬁne P
−1
t (x,0.5) as the value of ω that solves
the equation Pt(x,ω)=0 .5. By Assumptions 1(D) and 5(A), the probability function Pt is
strictly monotonic in ω and therefore there is a unique value ω that solves Pt(x,ω)=0 .5, i.e.,
P
−1
t (x,0.5) is identiﬁed for any x ∈ X.S i n c eMedian(˜ εt|x)=0 ,w eh a v et h a tPt(x,ω)=0 .5
implies that ˜ ht(x,ω)+˜ ct(x)=0 . Therefore, given P
−1
t (x,0.5) we can identify ˜ ct(x) as
˜ ct(x)=−˜ ht(x,P
−1
t (x,0.5)).T h e f u n c t i o n ˜ ct is identiﬁed on X.N o w , d e ﬁne the function
ω∗
t(x,u) from X×˜ ut(X×Ω) into Ω such that this function provides the value of ω that solves
the equation ˜ ht(x,ω)+˜ ct(x)=u.B yd e ﬁnition of ω∗
t(x,u) we can obtain this function for
u 6=0by solving in ω the equation ˜ ht(x,ω)=u + ˜ ht(x,P
−1
t (x,0.5)). Then, by construction
we have that, for any (x,u) ∈ X × ˜ ut(X × Ω), F˜ ε|x,t (u)=Pt(x,ω∗
t(x,u)).T h u s , F˜ ε|x,t is
identiﬁed. Q.E.D. ¥
Remark 1. The (diﬀerential) outcome function ˜ ht plays a key role in the identiﬁcation result
in Proposition 1 and on the rest of identiﬁcation results in this paper. The identiﬁcation of
P∗
t is possible because ˜ ht is identiﬁed and it depends monotonically on a continuous variable
ω that does not enter in ˜ ct and F˜ ε|x,t.
Remark 2. The counterfactual probability function is identiﬁed on the set [X × Ω]∗
t that is
a subset of X × Ω where the factual Pt is identiﬁed. However, there are diﬀerent cases in
14which [X × Ω]∗
t = X × Ω. For instance, that is the case when the range of variation of the
utility diﬀerences is the whole real line, or when ˜ τt is a positive valued function. The latter
occurs in applications where the outcome variable y has a lower bound at zero (e.g., output,
earnings, revenue), and we consider a counterfactual policy that increases the diﬀerential
outcome for any possible value of (x,ω). For instance, an increase in the returns of college
degree in a model for the decision of going to college.
Proposition 2 establishes the identiﬁcation of the welfare eﬀect function (V ∗
σ,t(x,ω) −
Vσ,t(x,ω))/ψt(x), that is measured in units of the outcome variable y.W eu s et h ef o l l o w i n g
Lemma in the proof of Proposition 2.
LEMMA 1: Consider the utility maximization problem max{u(0) + ε(0),u(1) + ε(1)}.M c -
Fadden’s social surplus is deﬁned as the expected surplus of behaving optimally instead of
choosing always alternative zero: that is, E˜ ε(max{˜ u − ˜ ε;0}),w h e r e˜ u ≡ u(1) − u(0) and
˜ ε ≡ ε(0) − ε(1).L e tF˜ ε be the CDF of ˜ ε,a n dl e tP be the probability Pr(˜ ε ≤ ˜ u|˜ u), i.e.,
P = F˜ ε(˜ u).I fF˜ ε is a continuous and strictly increasing function, then the social surplus is
af u n c t i o no f P and F˜ ε only. That is,




˜ ε (P) −˜ ε;0}dF˜ ε(˜ ε). (21)
Proof. Since F˜ ε is continuous and strictly increasing, we have that ˜ u = F
−1
˜ ε (P),w h e r e
F
−1
˜ ε is the inverse function of F˜ ε. Then, E˜ ε(max{˜ u − ˜ ε;0})=
R




˜ ε (P) −˜ ε;0}dF˜ ε(˜ ε).Q . E . D .¥
PROPOSITION 2: Under Assumptions 1 to 5 and β =0the functions (V ∗
σ,t(x,ω) −














where G(P,F) is McFadden’s surplus function as deﬁned in Lemma 1.




























where we have used Lemma 1 and the property ˜ h(x,ω)+˜ c(x)=F
−1
˜ ε|x(P(x,ω)).G i v e nt h a t
(u∗(0,x,ω)−u(0,x,ω))/ψ(x)=τ(0,x,ω),w eh a v et h a t(V ∗









.S i n c e P, P∗ and F˜ ε|x are identiﬁed
(Proposition 1), the surplus function, and therefore (V ∗
σ (x,ω)−Vσ(x,ω))/ψ(x),i si d e n t i ﬁed.
Q.E.D. ¥
3.2 Dynamic model
We now study the identiﬁcation of counterfactual choice probabilities when agents are for-
ward looking, i.e., when β>0. For the sake of simplicity, we present the proof in the context
of a ﬁnite horizon model, i.e., T<∞. However, the proof can be extended to inﬁnite horizon
models.7 The factual choice probability function is:
Pt(x,ω)=F˜ ε|x,t (˜ vt(x,ω)) (23)
where ˜ vt(x,ω) ≡ (vt(1,x,ω)−vt(0,x,ω))/ψt(x) is the diﬀerential value function.T h ec o u n -
terfactual choice probability function is P∗
t (x,ω)=F˜ ε|x,t(˜ v∗
t(x,ω)),w h e r e˜ v∗
t is the diﬀerential
value function after the policy change. We show in this section that the functions F˜ ε|x,t, ˜ v∗
t and
P∗
t are identiﬁed under the similar conditions as in Proposition 1. However, there are some
diﬀerences in the identiﬁcation results of the myopic and the dynamic or forward-looking
models. In the dynamic model we cannot identify current utility diﬀerences or any other
function that depends only on preferences and not on agents’ beliefs. That is, we cannot
7The proof of identiﬁcation in a model with inﬁnite horizon appears in an earlier version of this paper
which is available online at ideas.repec.org and at papers.ssrn.com.
16separately identify agents’ preferences and agents’ beliefs. Despite this under-identiﬁcation
of preferences, we can identify the counterfactual choice probabilities associated to the class
of experiments deﬁned in Assumption 3. We also need an additional assumption on the
function ψt(x).
ASSUMPTION 6: The function ψt(x) is time invariant and it only depends on time-
invariant individual characteristics: i.e., ψt(x)=ψ where ψ may vary over individuals.
Proposition 3 provides a characterization of the choice probability function that will be
useful to identify and to estimate the counterfactuals.
PROPOSITION 3: For any age t, the optimal choice probability function Pt has the following
form:











where: (1) ˜ V
(y)
t (x,ω) ≡ V
(y)
t (1,x,ω) − V
(y)
t (0,x,ω),a n dV
(y)
t (a,x,ω) is the expected, dis-
counted value of the sum of current and future realizations of the outcome variable y if the





t (1,x) − V
(c)
t (0,x),a n dV
(c)
t (a,x) is the expected, discounted value of the sum of current
and future realizations of the component c of the utility function if the current choice is a
and then alternative 0 is chosen forever in the future; and (3) ˜ V
(opt)





t (0,x,ω),w h e r eV
(opt)
t (a,x,ω) is the value of behaving optimally in the future minus the
value of choosing always alternative 0, given that the current choice is a. These functions















































17where G(P,F) is the surplus function that we have deﬁned in Lemma 1; F
(j)
ω (ω(j)|ω) is
the j-periods-forward transition probability function of ω;a n dF
(j)
0 (x(j)|a,x) is the j-periods-
forward transition probability of x given that the agent chooses alternative 0 at every period
in the future.8
Proof. For notational simplicity we omit ω as an argument in the diﬀerent functions. Given













+ G(Pt(x),F ˜ ε|x,t)
Solving this expression in equation (8) that deﬁnes the conditional choice value function













G(Pt+1(x(1)),F ˜ ε|x(1),t+1) dF(x(1)|a,x)
We can apply the same decomposition to the value vt+1(0,x (1)) that appears in this expres-























G(Pt+1(x(1)),F ˜ ε|x(1),t+1) dF(x(1)|a,x)+β
2
Z
G(Pt+2(x(2)),F ˜ ε|x(2),t+2) dF
(2)
0 (x(2)|a,x)



































8That is, the one-period forward transition is F
(1)





Fx(x(2)|0,x (1))Fx(x(1)|a,x)dx(1); three periods forward, F
(3)
0 (x(3)|a,x)= RR
Fx(x(3)|0,x (2))Fx(x(2)|0,x (1))Fx(x(1)|a,x)dx(1)dx(2),a n ds oo n .














t (x)). Q.E.D. ¥
P r o p o s i t i o n3e s t a b l i s h e st h a tw ec a nd e c o m p o s ea d d i t i v e l yt h ed i ﬀerential value function
˜ vt into the functions ˜ V
(y)
t , ˜ V
(c)
t ,a n d˜ V
(opt)
t . This decomposition is not arbitrary. We show
below that we can identify these three components of the diﬀerential value function, and
that these components, together with F˜ ε|x,t, is all what we need in order to construct the
counterfactual choice probability P∗
t . First, note that the functions ˜ V
(y)
t and ˜ V
(c)
t do not
depend on the optimal behavior of the individual. Therefore, it is straightforward to show









t (x)+˜ Υt(x,ω) (26)














Given the functions {τt}, the discount factor and the transition probabilities, it is straight-
forward to construct ˜ Υt(x,ω), which is identiﬁed.
The value function V
(opt)
t depends on the agent’s future optimal behavior and therefore
on the optimal choice probability functions from period t +1until period T.T oe m p h a s i z e
this dependence, we incorporate future choice probabilities as an explicit argument in this
function: ˜ V
(opt)
t (x,ω;{Pt+j : j>0}). N o t et h a ta l lt h ep r i m i t i v e st h a te n t e re x p l i c i t l yi n
this value function (i.e., transition probabilities, distribution of ˜ ε, and discount factor) are
policy invariant: they are the same before and after the policy change. Therefore, the only
way in which the value function ˜ V
(opt)
t is aﬀected by the policy change is through the change
in the optimal behavior between periods t+1and T, i.e., through the change in the optimal
choice probabilities between t +1and T. Taking into account these considerations, we can
















Proposition 4 establishes the identiﬁcation of the counterfactual choice probabilities.
PROPOSITION 4: Suppose that Assumptions 1 to 6 hold and that the discount factor β is
known. For any period t,d e ﬁne the set [X×Ω]∗
t ≡ {(x,ω) ∈ X×Ω :˜ v∗
t(x,ω) ≥ ˜ vt(x,−∞)}.
The counterfactual choice probability functions {P∗
t } are identiﬁed over the sets {[X ×Ω]∗
t}.
Starting at the last period, t = T, the probability P∗







t (x0,ω 0) is a function from [X × Ω]∗
t into Ω that is implicitly deﬁned as the value













Furthermore, the diﬀerential value functions {˜ V
(c)
t } are identiﬁed on X,a n dt h ep r o b a b i l i t y
distributions {F˜ ε|x,t} are identiﬁed on ˜ νt(X×Ω)×X,w h e r e˜ νt(X×Ω) is the space {˜ νt(x,ω):
(x,ω) ∈ X × Ω}.
Proof: W es t a r ta tl a s tp e r i o dT and then proceed backwards. At period T,t h e r ei sn o
future and therefore the decision problem is static. We can apply Proposition 1 to show the
identiﬁcation of functions P∗




T (x0,ω0) b et h ef u n c t i o nt h a ti sd e ﬁned in the enunciate of the Proposition. For
period T, ω
(τ)
T (x0,ω 0) is implicitly deﬁned as the value ω ∈ Ω that solves the equation
˜ hT(x0,ω)=˜ τT(x0,ω0)+˜ hT(x0,ω 0). By Assumption 5, the function ω
(τ)
T (x0,ω 0) exists and
is unique at any point (x0,ω0) ∈ [X × Ω]∗















20Given that the factual choice probability function PT is identiﬁed on X×Ω and the function
ω
(τ)
T is identiﬁed on [X × Ω]∗
T, it is clear that P∗
T is identiﬁed on [X × Ω]∗
T.F o l l o w i n g t h e
same arguments as in Proposition 1, we can prove the identiﬁcation of functions ˜ cT (which is
equal to ˜ V
(c)
T )a n dF˜ ε|x,T. Now, consider the decision problem at some period t<T.S u p p o s e
that the sequence of future probability functions {P∗
t+j : j>0} and the sequence of future




t+j : j>0}) is also identiﬁed because it only depends on {P∗
t+j : j>0} and
{F˜ ε|x,t+j : j>0}. The functions ˜ Υt, ˜ V
(y)
t and ˜ V
(opt)
t (.;{Pt+j : j>0}) are also identiﬁed. By
Assumptions 4 and 5 the function ω
(τ)
t exists and is unique at any point in the set [X ×Ω]∗
t.
And given the identiﬁcation of ˜ Υt, ˜ V
(y)
t , ˜ V
(opt)
t (.;{P∗
t+j : j>0}),a n d˜ V
(opt)
t (.;{Pt+j : j>0}),
it is clear that ω
(τ)
t is identiﬁed on [X × Ω]∗
t. Using this function, we have that:
P∗





























t is identiﬁed. Following the same arguments as in Proposition 1, we can prove
the identiﬁcation of functions ˜ V
(c)
t and F˜ ε|x,t. Thus, by a backwards induction argument, the
sequence of functions {P∗
t , ˜ V
(c)
t ,F ˜ ε|x,t : t =1 ,2,...,T} is identiﬁed. Q.E.D. ¥
The functions {˜ V
(c)
t } depend on preferences and on transition probabilities of the state
variables. Without further restrictions we cannot separately identify preferences. A restric-
tion that identiﬁes the utility function c(a,x)/ψ is the "normalization" c(0,x)=0for any
x ∈ X. By the deﬁnition of ˜ V
(c)
t in equation (25) it is simple to verify that under this
restriction we have that V
(c)




t (1,x)=c(1,x)/ψ.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
this normalization is innocuous for the type of counterfactual experiments that we consider
in this paper (i.e., Assumption 3). That is, if the true c(0,x) is not zero, then it is no longer
true that our estimator of ˜ V
(c)
t is a consistent estimator of c(1,x)/ψ, but this misspeciﬁca-
tion does not aﬀect the consistency of our estimation of P∗
t because P∗
t depends on c(1,x)/ψ
21and c(0,x)/ψ only though ˜ V
(c)
t . Nevertheless, this normalization is not innocuous for the
evaluation of other type of policy interventions which we do not consider in this paper, such
as those that modify the transition probabilities of the state variables or the discount factor.












are identiﬁed. We can obtain these functions as:
(V ∗
















t+j : j>0}) − ˜ V
(opt)
t (0,x,ω;{Pt+j : j>0})
i
(31)
where G(P,F) is McFadden’s surplus function as deﬁned in Lemma 1.
Proof. By the deﬁnition of the value functions V ∗



















t(0,x,ω) − vt(0,x,ω)]/ψ + G
¡
P∗



















t (0,x,ω;P∗).S o l v i n g





/ψ, we can get equation (31).
Proposition 5 establishes the identiﬁcation of all the functions in the right hand side of this
equation. Q.E.D. ¥
4 Estimation method
Suppose that we have a random sample of N individuals, indexed by i, for which we observe
actions, states and outcomes at two consecutive periods: {aiti,a i,ti+1,x iti,x i,ti+1,y iti,y i,ti+1}.
The method proceeds in two steps.
Step 1: Estimation of the outcome function h, the transition probabilities Fω and Fx,a n d
the (factual) choice probability functions {Pt}. First, we estimate the outcome functions ht.
22Given these functions we can get the residuals ˆ ωiti = ˆ h
−1
ti (yiti,a iti,x iti) which are consistent
estimates of the true ω0s. Then, we use {ˆ ωiti} to obtain a kernel estimator of the transition


























n is the bandwidth and K(.) is the kernel function. Similarly, we estimate the





























In all these kernel estimations we use cross-validation to select the optimal bandwidth.9
Step 2: Recursive Backwards estimation of the functions { ˆ P∗
t }, {ω
(τ)
t } and {F˜ ε|x,t}.
[At period T] Starting at the last period T, we can estimate ω
(τ)
T (x0,ω 0) using
the estimator ˆ ω
(τ)
T (x0,ω0) that solves in ω the equation ˆ hT(x0,ω)=˜ τT(x0,ω0)+
ˆ hT(x0,ω0). For instance, suppose that ˜ ht(x,ω)=gt(x)exp(σtω),w h e r egt(.) is
nonparametrically speciﬁed. This is the class of outcome function that we use in
9In some applications, the kernel estimate of the function P may not be strictly monotonic in ω.
Monotonicity of ˆ P is necessary for the subsequent estimation of the threshold functions ωτ
t and therefore for
the estimation of the eﬀects of the counterfactual policy. If that is the case, we can impose monotonicity
using the isotonic-smooth (IS) kernel estimator proposed by Mukerjee (1988) and Mammen (1991). The
estimator can be deﬁned in two steps. Suppose that the observations have been sorted with respect to the
variable ˆ ω, such that ˆ ω1 ≤ ˆ ω2 ≤ ... ≤ ˆ ωN.T h eﬁrst step is an isotonic regression for {ai} on {ˆ ωi}:






t − s +1
The second step introduces smoothing by using a Nadaraya-Watson kernel estimator where the dependent
variable is the isotonic regression { ˆ PI((xi, ˆ ωi)} and the explanatory variable is ˆ ω.
ˆ PIS(x,ω)=
PN

























23the empirical application in section 4. Then, there is the following closed form















We calculate ˆ ω
(τ)
T (x0,ω0) for every x0 ∈ X and over a ﬁnite grid of points ˆ Ω that
is included in Ω. Then, we estimate P∗
T(x0,ω0) as:
ˆ P∗



































We can also estimate the distribution function F˜ ε|x,T as:





































T(x0,u 0) is the value of ω that solves the equation ˆ hT(x0,ω)=u0 +
ˆ hT(x0, ˆ P
−1
T (x0,0.5)). Following with the example with ˜ ht(x,ω)=gt(x)exp(σtω),



















As with function ˆ ω
(τ)
T , we calculate ˆ ω
∗
T(x0,ω0) for every x0 ∈ X and over a ﬁnite
grid of points ˆ Ω ⊂ Ω.
[At period t < T] Using the deﬁnitions of functions ˜ V
(y)
t and ˜ V
(opt)
t we construct
the estimators ˆ V
(y)
t (x0,ω0), ˆ V
(opt)
t (x0,ω 0;{ ˆ Pt+j : j>0}) and ˆ V
(opt)
t (x0,ω 0;{ ˆ P∗
t+j :




t in terms of




t+1 . Given these estimators, we can
now obtain the estimators ˆ ω
(τ)
t and ˆ ω
∗



































































This estimator of { ˆ P∗
t } is consistent and asymptotically normal under standard regularity
conditions. The Nadaraya-Watson estimators in step 1 are consistent, and the estimators
in step 2 are continuous and diﬀerentiable functions of the estimators in step 1. However,
we do not derive in this paper the rate of convergence and the asymptotic distribution of
our estimator of ˆ P∗
t . In the empirical application that we present in section 5, we use the
bootstrap method to approximate the standard errors of the estimated policy eﬀects.
The computational cost of getting a point estimate using this procedure is equivalent to
solving the dynamic programming problem once. Though the computational cost increases
exponentially with the number of cells in the state space, it is clear that we can use this
method for any dynamic programming model that we be solved once in a reasonable CPU
time. Of course, obtaining bootstrap standard errors is computationally more intensive.
In some applications with not few observations or not enough sample variability, the
nonparametric estimator of { ˆ P∗
t } can be quite imprecise. However, we may be interested
in some aggregate average eﬀects of the policy, such as the Average Treatment Eﬀect,
ATEt = Ex,ω(P∗
t (xti,ωti) − Pt(xti,ωti)). This parameter can be consistently estimated by
using (1/N)
Pn
i=1 I{ti = t}( ˆ P∗
t (xti,ωti) − ˆ Pt(xti,ωti)) which is typically a root-N consistent
25estimator and that can provide precise estimates even when the estimator of the functions
have a large variance.
5A n a p p l i c a t i o n
This section presents an application of this methodology to evaluate the eﬀects of an hypo-
thetical reform in the social security pension system in Sweden. The main purpose of this
application is to illustrate the implementation of the method and to show that it can provide
meaningful results in relevant contexts. Our model of retirement behavior follows Rust and
Phelan (1997) and Karlstrom, Palme and Svensson (2004). The reform that we consider
consists in a delay of three years in eligibility ages of the public pension system. The mini-
mum age to claim a public pension goes from 60 to 63 years, and the normal retirement age
goes from 65 to 68. This type of reform has been and it is still considered in many OECD
countries.
5.1 A model of retirement behavior
At the beginning of each year, individuals decide whether to continue working (at =1 )o rt o
retire from the labor force (at =0 ). This decision is irreversible. Individuals have a utility
function that is additively separable in consumption (Ct) and leisure (Lt). More speciﬁcally,
˜ Ut = ψC UC(Ct)+ψL(t,mt,ε t) UL(Lt) (40)
where the functions ψC and ψL(t,mt,ε t) capture individual heterogeneity in the marginal
utilities of consumption and leisure, respectively10; t represents age; mt is marital status; and
εt is an individual idiosyncratic shock in the marginal utility of leisure that is unobservable
to the econometrician (e.g., unobserved health status).
If the individual works, his hours of leisure are equal to L(1,t,m t,ε t) and his annual
earnings are equal to the labor earnings Wt. If the individual decides to retire, then his
hours of leisure are L(0,t,m t,ε t) and earnings are equal to retirement beneﬁts Bt.T h u s ,
10The marginal utility of consumption ψC may depend on time-invariant individual characteristics.
26we can write leisure as Lt = L(at,t,m t,ε t) and annual earnings as Yt = atWt +( 1− at)Bt.
L a b o re a r n i n g sd e p e n do na g ea n do naw a g es h o c k :
log(Wt)=hW(t)+ωt+1 (41)
hW(.) is a function and ωt+1 is an individual wage shock that follows a Markov process
ωt+1 = ρ(ωt)+ξt+1 where ρ(.) is a function and ξt+1 is the innovation of the process. The
individual knows ωt when he decides whether to retire at age t, but he does not know the
innovation ξt+1. Retirement beneﬁts depend on retirement age (rat)a n do npension points
(ppt): Bt = B(rat,pp t). We describe this function in section 5.2 below.
The state variables of the model are εt, ωt and xt =( t,mt,ra t,pp t). N o t et h a tt h e
retirement status (i.e., at−1) is implicitly given by the retirement age. Since the individual
has uncertainty about current labor earnings, the relevant current utility Ut is the expected
utility Et(˜ Ut) where the information set at period t is (at,x t,ωt,ε t).
Ut = Et(˜ Ut)=ψC Et (UC (Ct)) + ψL(t,mt,ε t) UL (L(at,t,m t,ε t)) (42)
Deﬁne the functions c(0,t,m t) and c(1,t,m t) and the variables εt(0) and εt(1) such that, for
a =0 ,1:
c(a,t,mt) ≡ Median(ψL(t,mt,ε t) UL(L(a,t,mt,ε t)) | t,mt)
εt(a) ≡ ψL(t,mt,ε t) UL (L(a,t,mt,ε t)) − c(a,t,mt)
(43)
Using these deﬁnitions we can rewrite the utility function as:
Ut = ψC Et (UC (Ct)) + c(at,t,m t)+εt(at) (44)
We now show that the utility function Ut can be represented in the form that we postu-
late in Assumptions 1 and 2. That is, we have to show that the term ψC Et(UC(Ct)) can
be written as ψyt,w h e r eyt is an observable variable for the researcher. If we could observe
individuals’ consumption Ct, we would need very weak assumptions to have the type of
structure in Assumptions 1 and 2. However, as in many other previous econometric models
of retirement, we do not observe individual consumption. Instead, we observe labor earnings
27Wt for those individuals who are working, and potential retirement beneﬁts Bt for every indi-
vidual, working or not. Following Rust and Phelan (1997), we assume that: (1) consumption
is proportional to earnings, and the proportionality may depend on age and marital status,
Ct = λYt; and (2) the utility of consumption is a CRRA function, UC(Ct)=Cα
t where α
is the parameter of relative risk aversion. Furthermore, we also assume that this parameter
α is known to the researcher. We can evaluate a policy under diﬀerent scenarios for the
degree of risk aversion. Under these conditions we can write ψC Et(UC(Ct)) as ψyt,w h e r e
ψ ≡ ψCλ
α,a n dyt ≡ E(Y α
t |at,t,m t,ra t,pp t,ωt).
Now we show that Assumption 4 holds in this model: i.e., that the outcome function yt =
h(at,x t,ω t) is identiﬁed. When at =0 ,w eh a v et h a th(0,x t,ωt)=Et(Bα
t )=B(rat,pp t)α,
w h i c hi sak n o w nf u n c t i o nf o rt h ee c o n o m e t r i c i a n .I fat =0 ,t h e nh(1,x t,ω t)=E(Wα
t |xt,ωt).
Given the previous assumptions about labor earnings, we have that Wα
t =e x p {αhW(t)+
αρ(ωt)+αξt+1},a n dEt(Wα
t )=e x p {αhW(t)+αρ(ωt)}. We now describe how hW(.) and ρ(.)
can be nonparametrically identiﬁed from data on Wt and t from the subsample of working
individuals. Given that lnWt = hW(t)+ρ(ωt)+ξt+1,a n dωt =l nWt−1 −hW(t−1),w ec a n
write:
lnWt = hW(t)+ρ(lnWt−1 − hW(t − 1)) + ξt+1 if at =1 (45)
The innovation ξt+1 is i.i.d. over time and unknown to the individual when he makes his
decision at period t. Therefore, ξt+1 is independent of at and it is also independent of t and
Wt−1. The orthogonality condition E(ξt+1|at =1 ,t,W t−1)=0provides moment conditions
that allow us to estimate nonparametrically the functions hW(.) and ρ(.).
285.2 Social security pensions and the counterfactual reform
The form of the beneﬁts function B(.,.) depends on the rules of the pension system. For the
case of social security pensions in Sweden, we have that:
Bt = B(rat,pp t)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0 if rat <R A min
ppt (1 + κ1 (rat − RAnorm)) if RAmin ≤ rat <R A norm
ppt (1 + κ2 (rat − RAnorm)) if RAnorm ≤ rat <R A max
ppt (1 + κ2 (RAmax − RAnorm)) if rat ≥ RAmax
(46)
where RAmin, RAnorm, RAmax, κ1 and κ2 are policy parameters that characterize the function
B(.,.). More speciﬁcally: RAmin is the minimum retirement age; RAnorm is the "normal"
retirement age; κ1 is a permanent actuarial reduction in beneﬁt sp e ry e a ro fe a r l yr e t i r e m e n t ;
and κ2 is a permanent actuarial increase in beneﬁts per month of delayed retirement. For
our sample period, 1983-1997, the values of these parameters in Sweden were RAmin =6 0
years, RAnorm =6 5years, RAmax =7 0years, κ1 =6 .0% and κ2 =8 .4%.
An individual’s pension points ppt are a deterministic function of his whole history of
earnings. However, it turns out that for many public pension systems the transition rule of
pension points can be very closely approximated by a Markov process. For instance, that is
the case for social security pensions in US (see Rust and Phelan, 1997), for Germany (see
Knaus, 2002), and for Sweden (see Karlstrom, Palme and Svensson, 2004). Following these
previous studies, we assume that pension points follow the process:
log(ppt+1)=hB(t,ppt)+ηt+1 (47)
where hB(.,.) is a function and ηt+1 is the innovation of the process.
As mentioned above, the counterfactual policy that we evaluate is a three years delay
in the eligibility ages. The new eligibility ages are RA∗
min =6 3 , RA∗
norm =6 8 , RA∗
max =7 3
years. Figure 1 presents the age proﬁles of beneﬁts function before and after the reform.
This reform does not aﬀect the current utility when working, and therefore τ(1,x t)=0 .T h e
change in the current utility when retired τ(0,x t),m e a s u r e di nu n i t so ft h eo u t c o m ev a r i a b l e
29(i.e., earnings), is just the vertical diﬀerence between the two beneﬁts functions in ﬁgure 1.
We represent the age proﬁle of τ(0,x t)/ppt in ﬁgure 2.
5.3 Data
The data come from the Swedish Longitudinal Individual Panel (LINDA). This dataset has
been used before by Karlstrom, Palme and Svensson (2004, KPS hereinafter) to estimate
a (parametric) dynamic structural model of retirement. The sample in KPS includes blue-
collar workers who were born between 1927 and 1940. The observation period is 1983 to
1997. We select the subsample of men from the sample used by KPS. Our sample contains
3,129 individuals and 34,593 observations during the period 1983-1997.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables that we use in this paper. Figure
3 shows the histogram of retirement ages for the subsample of 834 individuals who retire
during the sample period. The average retirement age is 63.5 years and almost 46% of these
individuals retired at age 65.D e s p i t et h ep e a ka ta g e6 5 ,t h e r ei ss i g n i ﬁcant variability in
retirement age. The range of retirement ages goes from 51to 69 years.
5.4 Step 1: Wage function and transition and choice probabilities
(a) Wage equation and stochastic process of the wage shock. Remember from section 5.1
that solving the stochastic process of the wage shock into the log-wage equation we get:
log(Wit)=hW(t)+ρ(lnWi,t−1 − hW(t − 1)) + ξi,t+1 if ait =1 (48)
We observe Wit and Wi,t−1 only for the subsample of individuals who are still working at age
t. However, under our assumption that ξi,t+1 is unknown to the individual when he makes
his decision at age t, there is not selection bias in a least squares estimation of hW(.) and
ρ(.) using equation (48). In contrast, note that a least squares estimation of hW(.) based
on equation log(Wit)=hW(t)+ωi,t+1 suﬀers of selection bias because ωi,t+1 is not mean
independent of the individual’s choice at period t. The Markov structure of the wage shock
and our assumption on the arrival of information are both needed to control for potential
30selection bias. We consider a polynomial series approximation to the functions hW and ρ,
and we use Akaike’s information criterion to choose the orders of these polynomials. Table
2 presents our estimates and ﬁgures 4 and 5 represent graphically these estimates. The
function hW is quadratic and ρ is cubic. Labor earnings reach their life-cycle maximum at
age 60. There is strong persistence in the labor earnings shock ω. Given the residuals of
this regression, {ˆ ξi,t+1}, we estimate the density function of ξ using a kernel method with a
Gaussian kernel and cross-validation for the choice of bandwidth. The estimated density, in
ﬁgure 6, has very strong kurtosis at zero together with a long left tail. That is, innovations
in labor earnings are typically very close to zero, but it is possible to observe a very negative
shock (e.g., a period of unemployment during the year). Figure 7 shows that these properties
also appear in the density of ω.
(b) Stochastic process of pension points. From section 5.2, the speciﬁcation of this process
is: log(ppi,t+1)=hB(t,ppit)+ηi,t+1,w h e r eηi,t+1 is i.i.d. over individuals and over time.
Again we use polynomial series for the function hB(.,.) and Akaike’s information criterion
to choose the order of the polynomial. Table 3 presents the estimated function ˆ hB.F o ra n y
age, there is a monotonic relationship between current and next year pension points.
(c) Transition of marital status. The transition probability function of the married dummy
variable mt depends on age. Figure 8 presents our kernel estimates of the probabilities
Pr(mt+1 =1 |mt =1 ,t) and Pr(mt+1 =1 |mt =0 ,t). Not surprisingly (especially for male,
given that their mortality rate is higher than for women), there is very high persistence in
marital status at these ages, and age has very small incidence in these transition probabilities.
Thus, the estimated probabilities Pr(mt+1 =1 |mt =1 ,t) and Pr(mt+1 =0 |mt =0 ,t) are
very close to one for every age t.
(d) Choice probability functions Pt(m,pp,ω). We have considered two estimation methods
of the factual (and counterfactual) choice probabilities: (1) Nadaraya-Watson with cross-
validation; and (2) a logit model with a very ﬂexible speciﬁcation in terms of the variables
(t,m,pp,ω). The estimation results from the two methods are qualitatively identical. Table
314 presents our estimation of the logit model. The explanatory variables are dummies for each
age between 55 and 68, a second order polynomial in age, the wage shock, the logarithm
of pension points, and interactions of these variables with the married dummy. Figure 9
presents the age proﬁle of the estimated probability of working evaluated at the mean values
of the other explanatory variables. The most striking feature is the very low probability of
working at the "normal" retirement age of 65. Though the probability decreases signiﬁcantly
between ages 60 and 64, the big jump occurs from age 64 to 65, i.e., from a value 0.8258 to
0.3280. The estimates are not very precise for ages older than 65 because there is a small
number of individuals who are still working at these ages. Figure 10 represents the estimated
probability of working as a function of the wage shock ω and evaluated at age 65 and the
mean values of the other state variables. The estimated function is monotonic in ω.T h e
estimation is quite precise for values of ω between values −1.0 and +0.5 which correspond
to percentiles 3.5 and 98.5, respectively. Most importantly, the probability of working is
very responsive to the wage shock. This probability goes from 0.17 for ω = −2.0 to 0.97 for
ω =2 .0. This strong dependence of the working decision with respect to ω is important to
identify the functions ω
(τ)
t and ω∗
t (and therefore the counterfactuals P∗
t )o v e raw i d er a n g e
of variation.
5.5 Step 2: Counterfactual choice probabilities
We start at age T =7 5 , and use the backwards recursive method that we have described in
section 4 to obtain the sequence of estimators { ˆ P∗
t }, {ˆ ω
(τ)
t } and { ˆ F˜ ε|x,t} between t =5 0and
t =7 5 . Figure 11 presents the estimates ˆ Pt and ˆ P∗
t for ages between 50 and 75 and evaluated
at the mean values of the other state variables (mt,pp t,ωt). The average retirement age goes
from 63.47 to 64.95 years. The policy has several eﬀects on the age proﬁle of the probability
of working. It increases between ages 60 and 63. There is a signiﬁcant reduction at age 63.
The probability of working increases between ages 64 and 67. There is also a new downward
peak at age 68, the new ’normal’ retirement age. Interestingly, the down peak at age 65 does
32not completely disappear after the reform. This could be due to misspeciﬁcation of the model
or to small-sample-bias in the nonparametric estimates. The peak at age 65 disappears only
when we (artiﬁcially) increase the magnitude of the partial derivative of ˆ Pt with respect to
ωt. Therefore, it seems that the eﬀect might be due to a downward bias in our estimate
of this partial derivative. Alternatively, one might think that there are reasons, other than
the social security system, why people retire at 65..Or at least, that there exit other reasons
which are not captured by our simple model of retirement.
6 Summary and Conclusions
This paper presents a nonparametric approach to evaluate the behavioral and welfare ef-
fects of counterfactual policies using a dynamic structural model. The nonparametric struc-
tural model retains all the economic assumptions of a structural model (e.g., exogene-
ity/endogeneity assumptions, equilibrium concept, rational expectations, transition rules,
independence assumptions, agents’ information) but it is more robust than a parametric
model because it relax the parametric assumptions. There are many situations in which a
parametric model can be preferred either because its parsimony or to obtain more precise
estimates. In these cases, our nonparametric approach can be used to test for the validity
of a particular parametric speciﬁcation and to search for a valid parametric model. The
nonparametric approach has another interesting feature: it makes transparent the role that
the substantial economic assumptions play in the model and in the evaluation of a policy. It
is also a necessary ﬁrst step to test the validity of these economic assumptions.
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37Table 1
Summary Statistics
3,129 blue-collar male workers. Cohorts 1927-1940
Years 1983 to 1997
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max # Obs.
Married 0.711 0.453 0 1 34,593
Annual Labor Earnings(1) 195.8 52.2 1.0 1,591.0 34,593
Pension Points 4.46 0.88 0.13 6.50 34,593
Retirement Age(2) 63.47 2.39 51 69 834
(1) In thousands of Swedish Kronas. In 1997, US$ 1 ' 8 Swedish Kronas.
(2) Subsample of complete (uncensored) histories.
Table 2
Estimation of Wage Equation
and Stochastic Process of Wage Shock
Parameter(1) Estimate (Std. Error)
hW,0 (constant) 4.7465 (0.2041)
hW,1 (t) 0.0174 (0.0072)







(1) The function hW(t) is hW,0 + hW,1 t + hW,2 t2
The function ρ(ω) is ρ1 ω + ρ2 ω2 + ρ3 ω3
38Table 3
Estimation of Stochastic Process
of Pension Points





age2 -6.64 × 10−6 (4.53 × 10−6)





Estimation of Choice Probability Function
(Probability of Working)
Variable Estimate (Std. Error) Variable Estimate (Std. Error)
constant 32.5230 (8.8893) age -0.4328 (0.1450)
dummy age=55 -0.1483 (0.8785) log(pp) -5.496093 (5.1121)
dummy age=56 -1.1586 (0.6228) log(pp)2 -0.3162 (0.2612)
dummy age=57 -1.2248 (0.5914) ωt 8.7521 (3.2608)
dummy age=58 -1.1069 (0.6028) ω2
t 0.2580 (0.1364)
dummy age=59 -1.4228 (0.5969) age × log(pp) 0.0929 (0.0820)
dummy age=60 -2.6664 (0.5925) age × ωt -0.1104 (0.0486)
dummy age=61 -2.0099 (0.6365) age × married -0.0404 (0.0369)
dummy age=62 -2.0048 (0.6763) log(pp) × ωt -0.4187 (0.3581)
dummy age=63 -1.9853 (0.7224) dummy married 3.0896 (2.4262)
dummy age=64 -3.2234 (0.7647) married × log(pp) -0.3552 (0.4223)
dummy age=65 -5.1725 (0.8199) married × ωt 0.0413 (0.2940)
dummy age=66 -2.9375 (0.9134)
R-square 0.4644
dummy age=67 -2.2061 (1.011)
# Observations 31,464
dummy age=68 -2.2779 (1.0870)
40Figure 1. Age Proﬁle of Pension Beneﬁts (per pension point)
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43Figure 11. Factual an Counterfactual Probabilities
of Working at diﬀerent ages
(Evaluated at mean values of mt, ppt,ω t)
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